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ABSTRACT
Considering two potential sources of income (public grants and ticket reve-
nues), we have defined a theoretical model where the public agency is the prin-
cipal and the manager of the museum is the agent. This model allows us to
design the optimal contract between both sides and thus to establish the opti-
mal values of grants, ticket prices, budget and effort applied by the manager.
Furthermore, we have found a theoretical reason to explain the inelastic pricing
strategy that has been found in some of the empirical research on cultural and
sports economics.
The main conclusion is that the optimal contract allows a Pareto optimum
solution in prices that does not change if we introduce moral hazard into this
relationship. This solution allows us to conclude that the public agency should
regulate ticket prices in accordance with the social valuation. However, public
grants and museum budgets would be affected by the existence of this problem,
moving the equilibrium away from the Pareto optimum situation. In this case,
even with a risk averse manager and a risk neutral public agency, grants and
budgets will depend on results because higher budgets related to good results
provide the main incentives to increase the manager’s level of effort.
Although the focus of this paper is on museum administration, the model that
we have developed can be easily generalized and applied to other institutions,
such as schools, sport facilities or NGOs, which are able to raise funds directly
from private (e. g. ticket revenues or membership fees) or public sources (e.g.
public grants).
JEL Classification number: C70, D80, H20, H42, Z10.XXXXXInstituto de Estudios Fiscales
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1.    INTRODUCTION
Over recent years, the economics of museums has experienced remarkable
development (Johnson and Thomas, 1998) and the problem of funding has been
one of its most important issues. In this area, two main strands stand out,
namely the impact of charges and the public funding of museums. In the first
case, the advantages and disadvantages of charging have been much discussed.
Anderson (1998) defends free entry while O’Hagan (1995) and Bailey and Fal-
coner (1998) provide some arguments in favour of a charging policy. Frey
(1994) defends a price discrimination policy. Moreover, O’Hagan (1995) and
Luksetich and Partridge (1997) analyse the impact of admission charges on ac-
cess. They conclude that, in general, museum demand is price-inelastic, so ac-
cess is weakly responsive to increases on admissions charges.
On the other hand, Duffy (1992) provides some specific reasons to defend
public funding
1. In this field some research has been oriented towards deter-
mining the optimal quantity of grants, using the social valuation of museums
(Asworth and Johnson, 1996; Barros, 1997; Santagata y Signorelli, 1998). Other
studies have defined the instruments and procedures that public agencies have
used to assign public aid to different kinds of institutions (Schuster, 1989;
O’Hagan, 1998; Heilbrun and Gray, 2001). Both approaches have a common
methodological assumption: the relations between the public agency and the
manager of the museum are framed within an environment of certainty. How-
ever, from our point of view these relations can be considered in a framework
of uncertainty, using principal-agent models as a methodological approach.
These models permit the design of optimal contracts under conditions of im-
perfect information, and this is the aim of this paper.
Thus, we present a theoretical principal-agent model where the public
agency, which is risk-neutral, plays the role of the principal, and the manager of
the museum, who is risk-averse, plays the role of the agent. As a starting point,
the model is developed under symmetric information; that is to say, the princi-
pal and the agent have the same information and the former knows and is able
to control the effort made by the latter. Next, we relax these assumptions and
discuss the model under asymmetric information. In both cases, we assume that
the museum operates with zero marginal costs
2.
We also try to provide an answer to another question outstanding in cultural
economics
3: why are museums located on the inelastic segment of the demand
                                          
1   Beyond the economics of museums, Schuster (1989) , Fullerton (1991), Netzer (1992) or
Baumol (1997) analyse the determinants of grants to culture.
2   This assumption is quite common in the economics of museums, although it is questionable
(Bailey and Falconer, 1998).
3   This is also an important issue in sports economics. See for instance Noll (1974) for an em-
pirial study and Salant (1992) for theoretical work on pricing policy in this field.— 8 —
curve? (for performing arts, see Heilbrun and Gray, 2001, pp. 99-104; and for
museums, Luksetich and Partridge, 1997 and Bailey and Falconer, 1998,). Being
located on the inelastic section of the demand curve causes a theoretical prob-
lem, since the economic behaviour of a profit-maximizing firm should be to in-
crease prices in order to maximise revenues and profits. However, this is not
the observed behaviour of museums. There are some alternative explanations
for this contradiction. First, the ticket price is a relatively small proportion of the
total effective visiting cost of museums (which includes, for instance, transporta-
tion costs) with the consequence that, although the ticket price elasticity could
be small, demand is effectively price elastic. Second, the inelastic pricing strategy
to maximize profits is appropriate when the firm receives revenues from other
complementary goods (Marburger, 1997). Finally, the museum can follow an
objective other than profit-maximisation; for example, it can accept a compro-
mise between profits (or revenues) and number of visitors (Darnell, 1998). Our
paper can therefore be thought of as providing theoretical foundations for ine-
lastic pricing as an optimal strategy when there is a public agency which cares
about the number of visitors and which provides a grant to complement the
museum revenues.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we summarise the stylised
characteristics of the principal-agent approach. Section 3 develops our theoreti-
cal model with symmetric information; Section 4 describes the new equilibrium
when the manager can hide his effort to the public agency (moral hazard). Fi-
nally, in Section 5 we present the main conclusions of this paper.
2.   PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
Principal-agent models can be applied to any bilateral relationship, or con-
tract, where one of the participants, called the agent, carries out an action that
provides some benefit to the other participant, called the principal. The princi-
pal designs a contract that ties him to the agent and which sets down what pay-
ments correspond to each possible result. The agent chooses his action among a
set {E} of possible actions. The results of this action depend on the agent’s ef-
forts and on some non-controllable environmental conditions, usually denomi-
nated the “state of nature”, which imposes uncertainty on the relationship.
The main purpose of principal-agent theory is to characterise the optimal con-
tracts under diverse assumptions about the information available to the principal
and the agent. A contract can be defined as a credible commitment for both par-
ties, which specifies the obligations of each party and all the possible contingencies
of the relationship. That is to say, it should establish the mechanism of payments to
remunerate the agent under different circumstances. Moreover, these paymentsInstituto de Estudios Fiscales
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should be a function of verifiable and measurable variables, known by both partici-
pants or by a third party that can guarantee the fulfilment of the contract (i.e. a
court). If the contract is based on non-verifiable variables, arbitration is impossible
and both parties will have incentives to violate the agreements. Foreseeing this be-
haviour, nobody will therefore be willing to sign non-verifiable contracts.
As the principal is responsible for designing the contract, he will choose
those terms that allow him to reach his objectives at the lowest possible cost
and to try to correct for, as much as possible, the problems that will be present
in his relationship with the agent. The terms of the contract must be, in turn,
beneficial for the agent because otherwise he would not sign it. In short, the
utility of not signing the contract, denominated the reservation utility, U, should
be equal to or smaller than the utility of signing and accepting the terms of the
contract. Figure 1 summarises the temporal development of this game.
The development of the relationship is as follows. First, the principal (P) de-
signs the contract. Second, the agent (A) decides whether or not to accept it.
Third, the agent chooses which action to take i.e. he decides the level of effort
he chooses to put in to carry out the task for which he has been hired by the
principal. Simultaneously, the state of nature –a set of non-controllable envi-
ronmental variables (N)– comes into play; that is to say, these variables will in-
fluence the development of the relationship between the principal and the
agent. Consequently, the actual outcome of the relationship between the prin-
cipal and the agent will depend on the level of effort chosen by the agent and on
a random variable that represents the state of the nature faced by the agent, and
therefore the result will also be a random variable. Finally, the agent will receive
some payment in exchange for his effort.
Figure 1
A rejects the contract
P designs the contract
A accepts the contract
A chooses an action
Payments
Results
N plays— 10 —
When we apply this model to museum management, the results can be de-
fined as the number of museum visitors, ni,, which is a discrete variable going
from zero to the congestion level, N. The probability of getting a certain number
of visitors, ni,, will be denoted as pi (e) and is always strictly greater than zero.
Since this condition makes any result possible, whatever the agent’s effort, e, it
ensures that the principal can not infer the effort of the agent by observing a cer-
tain result. However, it is assumed that the greater the effort, the higher the
probability of obtaining good results and, consequently, the lower the probability
of them being bad
4. We will assume as well that the expected number of visitors
will increase at a decreasing rate with effort. In other words, there is a limit to the
expected number of visitors that can be achieved by intensifying the effort.
Given that one of the main characteristics of these models is the existence of
uncertainty, we will assume that the objective functions of the principal and the
agent are Von Neumann-Morgenstern functions. We will assume that the prin-
cipal wants to maximize a profit function that includes as arguments the number
of visitors, ni, and the grant to the museum, s, which can depend on the number
of visitors. We will denote this function as B[θ  ni – s(ni)], where B’>0 y B”≤ 0.
The concavity of B implies that the principal can be neutral or risk averse. In our
case, we assume that the public sector (the principal) is risk neutral, so B´´ = 0.
θ  is a positive constant that represents the public sector’s subjective valuation of
any visitor
5.
The museum manager’s behaviour can be considered within the terms of a
bureaucratic model (Niskanen 1968). Following this author, a bureau has the
following critical characteristics:
—   It is a non-profit organization.
—   It exchanges a specific output for a specific budget.
—   The bureaucrat maximizes his utility.
According to Niskanen (1968, pp. 293-294), the bureaucrat’s utility function
depends on “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power patron-
age, ease of managing the bureau and ease of making changes. All these vari-
ables (…) are positive, monotonic functions of the total budget of the bureau”.
Hence, we will consider the arguments of the agent utility function to be the
                                          
4   If this assumption does not hold then the principal and the agent would always agree on
the minimum effort since greater effort would not imply better expected results,rather a
lower utility to the agent. In this case, the minimum effort would assure the best expected
result and the payments to compensate the effort would be relatively low.Thus, the principal
would obtain the highest profits in expected terms.
5   A declining θ  could represent decreasing marginal utility of visitors, even for a risk neutral
principal. If the public sector had different valuations for different visitors, θ  would vary with
the visitors’ characteristics. This assumption could be used to analyse a special case of discri-
mination.Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
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museum budget and the effort put in (e). The budget includes ticket income, ni t
–where t is the ticket price– and the grant, s(ni). For simplicity, we will assume
that the utility function is additively separable and we will denote it as
U [ni t + s(ni), e] = u[ni t + s(ni)]-v(e), where u’>0, u”≤ 0, v’>0 y v”≥ 0.
These objective functions tell us that there are conflict of interests between
the principal and the agent. On the one hand, greater levels of effort will help to
assure a better result for the principal but will reduce the agent's utility. On the
other hand, bigger payments will reduce the principal’s profit but will increase
the agent's utility. The terms of the contract will match (i.e., serve to make
compatible) the interests of both participants.
3.   THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT UNDER SYMMETRIC
3.   INFORMATION
In this section we develop a model where both participants have the same,
but imperfect, information. Therefore, the public sector (principal) knows the
effort put in by the museum manager (agent). Under this assumption, effort
must be included in the contract clauses.
When designing the contract, the principal will try to maximise his expected
profit under the restriction that the agent agrees to sign the contract. With
symmetric information, the principal will be able to design a contract, accept-
able to the agent, in which the effort demanded by the agent is specified. When
the result is a discrete random variable, the following constrained maximisation
program can represent principal’s problem:
[]
[] U  v(e) -   ) n s( t n   u   (e) p      s.t.
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The restriction is known as the participation restriction and implies that the
principal should take into consideration the contracts that the agent is willing to
sign, given the level of effort that will be demanded.
The characteristics of an efficient contract can be found by solving this maxi-
misation program. Moreover, with symmetric information the principal can, at
the beginning of the relationship, determine the effort level compatible with his
maximum expected profit, and the agent will not be able to hide this from him.
Also, the contract can include clauses that give the agent incentives to put in this
level of effort.
The solution to this problem will be a Pareto optimum. Since the principal
tries to maximise his profit by giving the agent the minimum needed to accept— 12 —
the contract, U, at the maximum of the program [1] he/she will not be able to
improve without the agent losing utility, and vice versa.
The Lagrange function associated with this problem is:
    () [] () [] U (e)    v   ) n s( t n   u   (e) p   ) n s( - n θ   B   (e)   p     =   t,   ), s(n L i i i
N
0 = i i i i
N
0 = i i − − + ∑ λ + ∑ λ [2]
with the control variables being the level of effort, e; the ticket price, t; and the
grant, s(ni).
The first order conditions of this programme are:
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∂ [5]
We now analyse these conditions. First, we analyse the optimal grant under
symmetric information; second, we derive the optimal ticket price; and finally,
we obtain the optimal level of effort.
a)   The optimal grant mechanism
From the first of these conditions it can be observed that:
()
N} , {0,1,2,...     i   =
) n s( t n u
)) s(n n ( B
i i
i i ∈ ∀ λ
+ ′
− θ ′ [6]
This necessary condition implies that the ratio between the principal’s mar-
ginal profit and the agent's marginal utility of income should equal the Lagrange
multiplier for each of the possible results. Since B’ and u’ are always positive, λ
will be strictly positive at the optimum, implying that the participation restric-
tion is a binding constraint and the museum manager will get his reservation
utility, U, when he accepts the contract. λ  can be interpreted as a shadow
price which shows the value of a unit of the manager’s additional utility in
terms of public sector utility, that is to say, the exchange relationship among
the units of utility–income– of the principal and the agent.
As this first order condition has to be fulfilled whatever the number of visi-
tors, if the principal is risk neutral (B’ being a positive constant) the manager’s
marginal utility of income has to be the same at the optimum for any possible
result. However, if the agent is risk averse u’ will be decreasing with income, so
the budget has to be constant and independent of the number of visitors. In
terms of our problem, this implies that the public agency (principal) has to fullyInstituto de Estudios Fiscales
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insure the manager (i.e. the public agency has to fully guarantee the museum’s
budget). That means, allocating him a subsidy that, given the optimal level of
effort, allows the museum manager to obtain his reserve level of utility, U.
Hence, the subsidy has to be equal to:
t   n -  v(e)]   U [     u     s i
-1 + = [7]
which will depend negatively on the number of visitors and will decrease with
the box office income
6. This solution implies that the public sector has to cover
the shortfall in the museum budget in that it is not fully covered by ticket sales.
It can be observed that if the museum has enough ticket income to obtain the
required budget, then it will not have any subsidy and the subsidy may even be
negative, the latter implying that the museum is a positive source of finance for
the public sector
7.
Condition [6] implies a Pareto-optimal allocation. For this to be achieved, the
public agency and the manager should have the same information set (which
includes the probability of obtaining the different results) when they sign the
contract, and the manager should be able to require the manager to give his op-
timum effort. Under these conditions, the public agency has to compensate for
the museum deficit but we will not observe a cost inflation process, as is the
case for some festivals (Frey and Pommerehne, 1989).
b)   Optimal ticket price
Using the equilibrium value of λ  in equation [6] we can transform equation
[4] as follows:
                                          
6   When the museum budget is independent of results, a new visitor will decrease the opti-
mal grant by the amount of the ticket price.
























7   When the manager is risk neutral, all the payments that imply a similar expected budget for
the museum would generate the same utility for its manager and u’ would be constant. In this
case, the manager will agree to fully insure the public agency, in the sense that its net profits,
θ ni – s(ni), will be independent of the number of visitors. However, the optimum contract
will not imply a constant subsidy. Since θ  n i – s(ni) has to be constant, it can be observed
that, if there is a visitor more, the grant will increase in the amount of his/her political subjeti-
ve valuation (θ ).
With both parties risk neutral there will not be an unique equilibrium. Any payment scheme
that gave a museum the expected budget and yielded the reservation utility to its manager
(and assured that the participation condition was satisfied) would be a possible equilibrium.
Obviously, this set includes the solution represented by equation [7]. In conclusion, with
symmetric information the optimal revenue and risk allocation depends on the degree of risk
aversion of both participants.— 14 —
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If the public agency is risk neutral, it is possible to get:























This implies that, with respect to t, the expected marginal social profit (ex-
pected marginal revenue plus the expected marginal social value) has to be equal
to the marginal cost, in this case zero. Hence, the optimal ticket price obtained
from this principal-agent model corresponds to a Pareto optimum equilibrium.
Equation [9] can be easily expressed in terms of the expected demand elas-
ticity when we consider a linear demand function:





















































This implies that the demand elasticity will be equal to or less than one. Only
when the public agency does not care about visitors (θ  = 0), and its profit func-
tion only includes the subsidy, will the optimum be at the point where demand
elasticity is unitary. This is also the necessary condition to maximise ticket reve-
nues and, if public sector is risk neutral, to minimise the subsidy
8.
c)   Optimal effort level
The first order condition with respect to effort (equation [5]) can be written as:
() () v =   s n t u   (e) p'       +   s n B   (e) p' i i
N
1 = i i i
N
1 = i ′ λ 


 + ∑ λ − θ ∑ [10]
So, when the effort is optimum, the loss of utility due to an increase in effort
must be equal to the increase in the expected utility of the public sector plus the
increase in the manager’s expected income utility
9.
The optimal level of effort, subsidy and ticket price must be chosen at the be-







































                                          
8   If the public sector is risk averse and the manager is risk neutral then the optimal subsidy is
constant when θ  is zero.
9   The manager´s utility terms are multiplied by λ  to value them in terms of principal’s utility.Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
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Substituting λ  for its equilibrium value (equation [6]), and rearranging terms:
() () v  
u
B
  =  
e
n





























Hence, this first order condition requires that the expected marginal revenue
product of effort equals the marginal cost, where both are evaluated in terms of
the principal’s utility. This is clearly a Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
If the public sector is risk neutral and B’ is therefore constant, equation [12]




  = t  
e
n










Hence, at the equilibrium the expected marginal revenue product of effort
has to be equal to the manager’s marginal rate of substitution between budget
and effort, which increases at an increasing rate since we have assumed that
v’and v” are both positive. Since the participation condition has to be satisfied,
the equilibrium will be the point that gives utility U to the manager and fulfils the
first order condition represented by equations [3], [4] and [5].
4.   THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT UNDER ASYMMETRIC
4.   INFORMATION
In this section we develop a model where the public sector (principal) does
not know the effort put in by the museum manager (agent). Under this assump-
tion, effort can not be included in the contract clauses. For simplicity, we will
also assume that there are only two possible effort levels (high and low, denoted
with superindexes H and L) and that the principal is interested only in the high
effort. If the principal were interested in the low effort there would be no real
incentive problem and he would simply offer the agent the symmetric informa-
tion contract corresponding to this level of effort.As this is not the usual case,
the principal will generally need to include a new restriction in order to maxi-
mize his expected revenue when designing the contract. The new restriction is
known as the incentive constraint and it implies that the principal has to include
a payment schedule in the contract which gives the agent sufficient incentives to
choose the high effort level:












0 = i + ∑ ≥ + ∑
that is to say, the expected utility of choosing the high effort has to be higher
than the expected utility associated with the low effort.— 16 —
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The Lagrange function associated with this problem is:
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with the control variables being the ticket price, t; and the grant, s(ni). Since we
have only two effort levels and the incentives restriction show us that the manager
will agree to choose the high level of effort, this is not longer a control variable.
The first order conditions of this programme are:
()
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We now analyse these conditions. First, we analyse the optimal grant under
asymmetric information and second, we derive the optimal ticket price.
a)   Optimal grant mechanism
N} , {0,1,2,...     i  
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i =  this first order condition will be similar to equation [6] and
the solution will imply a Pareto equilibrium, equivalent to the symmetric infor-
mation solution. That is to say, there is no conflict between the principal and the
agent since the probability of getting any result does not depend on the effort.
Hence, the principal and the agent will agree on the agent choosing the low ef-
fort and the principal will pay a constant grant equal to  t   n - )]  v(e   U [     u     s i
L -1 + =
if the agent is risk averse.Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
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≠ λ  and the optimal grant mechanism will
not imply a Pareto optimal equilibrium since the museum budget will change
with the results (as u’ depends on ni) even when the public agency is risk neutral






i can be considered
as a signal about the effort realised by the agent given the observed result. The
higher this value for the observed result, the higher the probability that the mu-
seum manager had chosen the low effort level and the higher u’. Since u’ is de-
creasing in income, bad results will imply small budgets and small grants for the
museum.
If the public agency does not have perfect information, it should not use
the grants to fully insure the manager because he has incentives to be ineffi-
cient by reducing his effort and, for example, making inefficient expenditures
or not maximising alternative sources of revenue. The best choice for the
public agency is to use grants to give adequate incentives to the manager in
order to improve his effort level and thereby achieve more efficient museum
management.
b)   Optimal ticket price
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and using equation [17], this first order condition can be expressed as :
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which is exactly equation [8]. Hence, the existence of moral hazard does not
affect the optimal ticket price. We have the same first order condition that we
had under symmetric information with respect to the ticket price and the mu-
seum policy will fix the price on the inelastic part of the demand curve.
When the manager can hide his effort from the public agency, we have seen
that the budget has to be linked to results because this will provide incentives
for the manager to put more effort in. One possible way to link the budget to
the results (and permit increments in the budget) would be to allow the man-
ager to fix the ticket price and permit him to keep part of the total ticket reve-
nue. This solution, which could sometimes be considered efficient by
policymaker, is inefficient in that it implies fixing prices where private benefits— 18 —
(that is, marginal revenues) are equal to the marginal costs and does not take
into account social benefits. This is the main reason why incentives have to be
controlled using public grants. However, to avoid other kinds of inefficiencies,
grants associated with low result could even be negative.
5.   CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have developed a principal-agent model for museum financ-
ing. We have considered two potential sources of income: public grants and
ticket revenues.
Using this framework, we can determine the optimal financing policy and the
optimal managerial effort both when there is symmetric information (and where
the public agency can control the manager’s effort) and when the information is
asymmetric (and the effort can not be controlled). Our principal-agent model
justifies public funding of museums, especially when the manager can hide his
effort from the public agency. In this case, the public grant has to be used by the
public agency to provide adequate incentives to the manager to improve his ef-
fort level.
Analyzing the first order conditions of our model, and assuming that the prin-
cipal is risk neutral and the agent risk averse, we can conclude that under sym-
metric information the museum budget has to be constant and independent of
the number of visitors. This implies that the public agency has to fully insure the
manager’s museum budget, assigning him a subsidy that, given the optimal level
of effort, allows the manager to obtain his reservation level of utility, U. Hence,
the public sector has to cover the deficit of the museum budget where it has not
been covered by ticket sales. In this case, the public grant will decrease with the
number of visitors and the box office income.
The manager’s optimal effort level is Pareto-optimal with symmetric infor-
mation. This implies that around this point the loss of utility due to an increment
in effort must be equal to the increment in the expected social utility associated
with the rise in the number of visitors. Therefore, at the equilibrium the ex-
pected marginal revenue product of effort has to be equal to the manager’s
marginal rate of substitution between budget and effort.
However, these conclusions do not hold under asymmetric information.
When effort is difficult to control and we have a moral hazard problem, the
budget has to be linked with results because the principal needs to provide
some incentives to the manager in order to get high effort levels. Therefore, full
insurance is inefficient in this situation. In this case, the equilibrium is no longer a
Pareto optimum situation, at leastwith  respect to the budget and the grant.Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
— 19 —
The existence of asymmetric information will have no effect on prices, which
have to be fixed taking into account the public valuation of visits to the museum.
Furthermore, we have found a theoretical reason to explain the inelastic pricing
strategy that has been found in much empirical research, and which does not
depend on the existence of asymmetric information. Moreover, the optimal
ticket price is always Pareto optimal in the sense that it will equalize expected
social marginal profit (expected marginal revenue plus the expected marginal
social value) with the marginal cost.
Hence, transferring ticket pricing policy to the manager is not a correct way
to introduce adequate incentives under any circumstances. The manager should
not decide the ticket price. The public agency must regulate these prices in ac-
cordance with the social valuation and use grants as the incentive mechanism to
achieve the optimal managerial effort.— 21 —
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